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HELLER’S COLLATERAL DAMAGE:
AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO THE
FELON-IN-POSSESSION PROHIBITION
Carly Lagrotteria*
A longstanding firearm regulation in the United States prohibits individual
convicted of felonies and certain misdemeanors from possessing a firearm.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v.
Heller, waves of litigation challenged, among other laws, the felon-inpossession prohibition. Due to the lack of clarity in Heller and the Court’s
refusal to address it, there is an unsettling circuit split over whether and how
an individual can mount an as-applied challenge to the felon-in-possession
prohibition.
A decade after Heller, the Third Circuit upheld the first successful asapplied challenge while four circuits have denied the permissibility of these
challenges, creating an urgent need for clarification from the Court.
Because the Court denied certiorari in the Third Circuit case, the present
state of the law is that an individual’s right to restore their Second
Amendment rights is determined by where they live. The resulting issue
cannot be relegated to the gun control debate and instead represents a
constitutional dilemma that demands resolution by the Court. This Note
argues that the Court is shirking its duties and should not continue to leave
a fundamental right subject to an individual’s residence.
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INTRODUCTION
Far more important are the unfortunate consequences that today’s decision
is likely to spawn. Not least of these, as I have said, is the fact that the
decision threatens to throw into doubt the constitutionality of gun laws
throughout the United States.1
—Justice Breyer

One of the many collateral consequences of a felony conviction is the
federal prohibition on possessing a firearm. Commonly known as the “felonin-possession” law, this prohibition is one of the longstanding firearm
regulations dating back to the nation’s founding.2 Codified in 18 U.S.C
§ 922(g),3 the statute’s first subsection expressly prohibits individuals who
have been convicted of a felony or certain misdemeanors—along with other
enumerated classes of individuals—from possessing, shipping, or receiving
firearms or ammunition through any interstate commerce.4 Among all of the
subsections of the statute, § 922(g)(1) is the most prosecuted.5 In fact, the
felon-in-possession prohibition is the fifth-most charged offense in the
federal system.6 This is not surprising because as the Department of Justice
(DOJ) has stated, § 922(g)(1) violations are “generally simple and quick to

1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 722 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2. See infra Part I.A.1.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
4. Id. § 922(g)(1).
5. See, e.g., Daniel Reiss & Melissa A. Anderson, Post-Heller Second Amendment
Litigation: An Overview, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL., Nov. 2015, at 1, 8 (noting that “the
relatively large number of persons prosecuted each year under either provision, particularly
section 922(g)(1)”); Federal Criminal Prosecutions Fall Under Trump, TRACREPORTS (Sept.
1, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/480 [https://perma.cc/CY88-TAFY].
6. Federal Criminal Prosecutions Fall Under Trump, supra note 5. Firearm provisions
in the federal system are charged at a significantly lower rate than drug-related or immigration
crimes, which collectively make up over 60 percent of individuals. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
2016 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.A, at S-11 (2016),
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2016 [https://perma.cc/6WLG-2Z49]. Firearm
offenses are the third-most-charged category, but they make up about 10 percent of all
individuals sentenced in the federal system. Id.
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prove.”7 To establish a § 922(g)(1) violation, federal prosecutors only need
to prove (1) that the individual was convicted of a crime with a maximum
possible sentence exceeding one year8 and (2) his or her actual or
constructive possession of a firearm.9 Thus, the DOJ has advised federal
prosecutors that firearm violations, like § 922(g)(1), “should be aggressively
used.”10
Though § 922(g)(1) only made up about 8 percent of all federal charges
filed in the last year,11 the Trump administration has promised “aggressive
enforcement of federal firearm laws against those persons prohibited from
possessing firearms.”12 In fact, U.S. Attorney General (AG) Jeff Sessions
announced a “new and modernized” Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)
program, which seeks to better coordinate gun violence reduction efforts on
local, state, and federal levels—the DOJ’s centerpiece for crime reduction.13
If the current iteration of PSN mirrors its 2001 counterpart, § 922(g)(1)
charges will increase significantly in coming years.14
Though longstanding and aggressively enforced, the legality of § 922(g)(1)
has been questioned following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in District
of Columbia v. Heller15 in 2008.16 In fact, a “fractured” Third Circuit sitting
en banc became the first circuit to uphold a successful as-applied challenge
to the longstanding felon-in-possession prohibition in 2016,17 largely due to
Heller’s lack of guidance.18
In Heller, the Court undertook its first “in-depth examination of the Second
Amendment”19 and held that the Amendment protects the right of an

7. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 112, https://www.justice.gov/
usam/criminal-resource-manual [https://perma.cc/M9PP-VL34].
8. For state misdemeanors, the maximum possible sentence must exceed two years. 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(b).
9. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2015).
10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, § 112.
11. Quick Facts: Felon in Possession of a Firearm, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION,
https://www.ussc.gov/research/quick-facts/section-922g-firearms [https://perma.cc/V97M82JW].
12. Project Safe Neighborhoods: An Overview of the Strategy, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL.,
Jan. 2002, at 1, 3.
13. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at the Major Cities Chiefs Association
2017 Fall Meeting About Project Safe Neighborhoods and Other Initiatives to Reduce Violent
Crime (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessionsdelivers-remarks-major-cities-chiefs-association-2017-fall [https://perma.cc/Q4DN-YB8L].
PSN was introduced by the DOJ in 2001 under President George W. Bush as a
“comprehensive, strategic approach to reducing gun violence in America.” Project Safe
Neighborhoods: An Overview of the Strategy, supra note 12, at 1.
14. Compare Federal Criminal Prosecutions Fall Under Trump, supra note 5, with Ten
Year Decline in Federal Weapons Convictions, TRACREPORTS (Nov. 7, 2017),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/409/ (showing the highest number of weapons-related
offenses from 2004 to 2008 during PSN) [https://perma.cc/48K6-4BP9].
15. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
16. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 8.
17. Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847).
18. See infra Part I.C.2.
19. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
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individual, in addition to militias, to keep and bear arms.20 Groundbreaking
though it was, Heller left large gaps in Second Amendment jurisprudence, as
presciently noted by dissents written by Justices John Paul Stevens21 and
Breyer.22 In addition to not prescribing which standard of constitutional
scrutiny applies, the Court created confusion when it declared, nonchalantly,
that certain longstanding prohibitions on Second Amendment rights were
“presumptively lawful.”23 The Court failed to provide any guidance on the
full extent of the longstanding prohibitions or any justification for the
lawfulness.24 It stated that it would “expound” on these prohibitions “if and
when” they are challenged before the Court.25 Without any explanation of
the basis for the presumption and whether it is rebuttable, federal courts were
left without guidance in the waves of post-Heller challenges to firearm
regulations—particularly the felon-in-possession prohibition.26
This Note explores how Heller’s confusing and limited guidance on
Second Amendment challenges has resulted in federal courts sifting through
Heller’s tea leaves. The circuits have speculated and sometimes disagreed
about how Heller should be read to determine, for example, what level of
constitutional scrutiny to use and whether longstanding prohibitions are
constitutional on their face or as applied.27 Despite some consensus among
the circuits, there are multiple disagreements about what are permissible
challenges and the scope and nature of the analysis.28 For example, most
circuits have adopted some variation of a two-prong test created by the Third
Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella.29 But among these circuits, the
“precise formulation” of the test is not consistent.30 In some instances, the
circuits have applied their tests to the same law but have arrived at different
results. For example, the Third Circuit upheld en banc the first successful asapplied challenge to § 922(g)(1) in Binderup v. Attorney General.31 Four
other circuits have “left the door open to a successful as-applied challenge”
but have yet to uphold one, four circuits have rejected permissibility of the
as-applied challenges, and three circuits have expressed concern about
them.32 With such a deep circuit split, the Court needs to provide clarity
about whether as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are permissible, and if so,
what methods should be used to assess them.
20. See id. at 580–81.
21. See id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Heller “leaves for future cases the
formidable task of defining the scope of permissible regulations”).
22. See id. at 719 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that he “find[s] it difficult to understand
the reasoning that seems to underlie certain conclusions [that the Heller Court] reaches”).
23. Id. at 627 & n.26 (majority opinion).
24. See id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 635 (majority opinion).
26. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 8.
27. Id. at 8–9.
28. See id. at 9.
29. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
30. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 5.
31. 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16847).
32. Id. at 381–85 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, the Court recently provided needed clarity for a different criminal
statute by invalidating that statute’s clause based on its vagueness and the
lack of judicial consensus on how to determine whether predicate offenses
fell under the clause.33 That statute—the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA)—establishes a mandatory minimum for individuals charged under
§ 922(g)(1) who have three predicate drug offenses or violent felonies.34 In
addition to several enumerated felonies, the ACCA sets forth a residual
clause, which states that an offense is a “violent felony” if it “otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”35 Before deciding Johnson v. United States36 in 2015, the Court
sought to clarify the residual clause in four different cases beginning in
2007.37 Between 2007 and 2015, lower courts were confounded as evidenced
by the “pervasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one is
supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.”38
In evaluating the residual clause’s constitutionality, the Court held that
“[i]nvoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15
years to life does not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee of due
process.”39
The disagreement settled in Johnson is analogous to the disagreement
among the circuits present in the post-Heller as-applied challenges to
§ 922(g)(1). Yet, in June 2017, the Court denied certiorari to the DOJ’s
appeal of Binderup40 despite stating in Heller that it would determine
challenges to longstanding prohibitions—including the very statute at issue
in Binderup, § 922(g)(1)—as they arose.41 Notably, Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor both stated their disagreement with the denial of certiorari in
Binderup,42 and this Note explains why they are correct.
The current hodgepodge system for addressing as-applied challenges to
§ 922(g)(1) is marked by splits among and within circuits and needs to be
addressed by the Court. This Note addresses the need for a standardized
system or guidelines for courts faced with as-applied challenges to
§ 922(g)(1). By applying the analysis in Johnson, this Note highlights the
constitutional concerns of a shapeless system that evaluates and sometimes
restores Second Amendment rights, which the Court held to be fundamental
two years after Heller in McDonald v. City of Chicago.43

33. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012); see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555.
35. 18 U.S.C § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
36. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
37. Id. at 2562 (noting the four previous cases: James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192
(2007), Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122
(2009), and Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011)).
38. Id. at 2559–60.
39. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560.
40. Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847).
41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
42. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 2323.
43. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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Part I provides an overview of § 922(g)(1) and a summary of federal
judicial responses to facial and as-applied challenges to the statute. It also
provides an overview of Heller and McDonald as well as an examination of
the Third Circuit’s two-prong test for post-Heller challenges to firearm
regulations, including as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1). Part II examines
the void-for-vagueness doctrine and how the Court applied it in Johnson,
which invalidated the residual clause of the ACCA. Part III then assesses the
constitutionality of the Third Circuit’s Binderup test and uses the Court’s
rationale in Johnson to analyze it. Finally, Part IV proposes potential
legislative remedies to standardize the process for evaluating as-applied
challenges to § 922(g)(1) and urges the Court to grant certiorari on the next
case dealing with this issue due to the huge constitutional concerns of
restoration of a fundamental right that varies based on where one lives.
I. CHALLENGING THE FELON-IN-POSSESSION PROHIBITION
In Binderup, a fractured en banc Third Circuit upheld the first successful
as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1).44 Before analyzing this decision, this
Note explores the underlying statute and the legal challenges following
Heller. Part I.A provides an analysis of § 922(g)(1), including its historical
justification, its elements, and its options for rights restoration. Next, Part
I.B explores how the Court failed to provide proper guidance in Heller and
McDonald for federal courts on how to evaluate legal challenges to firearm
regulations. Part I.C then analyzes how the circuits responded to post-Heller
facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), focusing primarily on the
Third Circuit and its decision in Binderup.
A. Felon-in-Possession Prohibition: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
An understanding of § 922(g)(1) requires an historical analysis as well as
an explanation of its elements and exceptions. Part I.A.1 provides an
overview of § 922(g)(1), including a brief recitation of its historical
background and its current codification. Part I.B.2 outlines the options
provided by the statute for individuals impacted by § 922(g)(1) to have their
Second Amendment rights restored.
1. Section 922(g)(1) Overview
Prohibitions on individuals with felony convictions possessing firearms
can be traced back to the nation’s founding. In assessing § 922(g)(1)’s
historical justification, many circuits point to scholarly and historical sources
asserting that the right to bear arms is tied to “virtuous citizenry” and, thus,
allowing the government to disarm “unvirtuous citizens.”45 Responding to
Justice Stevens’s analysis of historical justification for the Second
44. Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 399 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323.
45. See, e.g., id. at 348 (citing United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir.
2010)); United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979–80 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Amendment, the Court in Heller notes a “highly influential” report from the
founding era,46 which Stevens identifies as The Address and Reasons of
Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to
Their Constituents, 1787.47 In an excerpt provided by Stevens, the “highly
influential” report asserted that the right to bear arms resides in the individual
“unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury.”48
The felon-in-possession law was first federally codified as part of the
Federal Firearms Act of 1938,49 which one scholar called “the most
significant pre-1968 attempt to impose federal controls on the commerce and
possession of a broad spectrum of firearms.”50 The 1938 Act created a
federal licensing system for firearm manufacturers, importers, and dealers,
including a prohibition on licensees from knowingly shipping firearms to
individuals convicted of a felony, “any person who is under indictment,” and
other enumerated classes.51 Thirty years later, the Gun Control Act of 1968
replaced portions of the 1938 Act by “extend[ing] . . . certain controls” on
firearms52 in response to the growing number of firearm deaths and recent
assassinations.53 One of the Gun Control Act’s purposes, as stated by the
Senate Judiciary Committee, was “to keep firearms out of the hands of those
not legally entitled to possess them,” including those with a “criminal
background.”54 Years later, the felon-in-possession prohibition is unchanged
and vigorously enforced.55
The prohibition on firearm possession for individuals convicted of felonies
and certain misdemeanors is codified at § 922(g)(1), among other
prohibitions on enumerated classes of individuals from shipping, possessing
or receiving firearms or ammunition via interstate commerce.56 This Note
only addresses the prohibition on individuals convicted of felonies.
The felon-in-possession nomenclature for § 922(g)(1) provides insight into
the law’s elements. To violate the statute, an individual must have (1) been
convicted of a “felony,” (2) possessed a firearm that affected interstate

46. Heller, 554 U.S. at 604.
47. Id. at 658 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting a rejected proposal for the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which was later included in a critique of the U.S. Constitution).
48. Id. (citing 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 665 (1971)).
49. Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 901–910) (repealed 1968).
50. Franklin Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 133, 139 (1975).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 902 (1964) (repealed 1968).
52. HARRY L. HOGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 85-166, GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968, AS
AMENDED: DIGEST OF MAJOR PROVISIONS, at iii (1985).
53. See, e.g., PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES TRANSMITTING PROPOSALS FOR GUN CONTROL LAWS, H.R. DOC. NO. 332, at 1–2
(1968); Zimring, supra note 50, at 146–47 (noting amendments created after the assassinations
of President John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert F. Kennedy).
54. S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 22 (1968).
55. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
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commerce, and (3) had knowledge of the firearm possession.57 The word
“felony” is a misnomer because an offense can qualify as a “crime” under
§ 922(g)(1) even if not labeled as a felony. State misdemeanors are included
under the statute if punishable by more than two years in prison.58 Further,
an offense qualifies as a “crime” under § 922(g)(1) based on the maximum
possible punishment determined by the law, not the individual’s actual
sentence.59 Additionally, any federal or state offense related to regulation of
business practices, such as antitrust or unfair trade violations, does not
qualify as a “crime” under the statute based on a statutory exception.60
Under § 922(g)(1), a “firearm” is (1) any weapon “which will or is
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of
an explosive,” (2) “the frame or receiver of any such weapon,” (3) a muffler
or silencer, or (4) any “destructive device.”61 The firearm need not be
operable, and in fact, qualifies under the statute as long as it was designed to
fire a projectile.62
A § 922(g)(1) violation generally is punishable by up to ten years of
imprisonment and a $250,000 fine.63 In fiscal year 2016,64 for example, the
average sentence for individuals convicted under § 922(g), including felonin-possession violations, was five years.65 The overwhelming majority of
those sentenced in fiscal year 2016 were male and over half were Black.66
2. Statutory Options for Rights Restoration
Once an individual is convicted of a qualifying offense, the felon-inpossession prohibition does not expire.67 However, due to “legislative
grace,” the statute includes certain instances where an individual can have
their right to possess a firearm restored.68 First, a prior conviction no longer
57. Joseph O. Anderson, Jr., What “Mens Rea Dilemma”? A Simple Solution to the 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Circuit Split, 37 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 371, 373
(2011).
58. A “crime” under § 922(g)(1) does not include state misdemeanors “punishable by a
term of imprisonment of two years or less.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).
59. See, e.g., Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(stating that “subject to a maximum possible penalty of” is the correct reading of “punishable
by” as used in § 921(a)(20)(b)), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
61. Id. § 921(a)(3).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 668 F.3d 576, 577 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting that proof
that the firearm is operable is not required by that court or its “sister circuits”).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
64. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) defined fiscal year 2016 as the period from
October 1, 2015, to September 30, 2016. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 6, app. A, at
S-159.
65. Quick Facts: Felon in Possession of a Firearm, supra note 11. The USSG provided
information for the statute as a whole, not the particularly subsections such as § 922(g)(1).
66. In fiscal year 2016, 96.9 percent of all individuals convicted were male and 51.7
percent were Black. Id.
67. See Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 350 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(stating that there is “no historical support for the view that the passage of time or evidence of
rehabilitation can restore Second Amendment rights that were forfeited”), cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847).
68. See id.
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qualifies as a “crime” under § 922(g)(1) if (1) it was expunged or set aside or
(2) the individual is pardoned or has his or her civil rights restored.69 There
is, however, an exception to this exception: the pardon, expungement, or
restoration must not expressly state that the individual has not retained the
right to “ship, transport, possess, or receive” firearms.70
Second, Congress provided a formalized application process for rights
restoration under § 925(c), which allows the AG to provide “relief” for
certain individuals.71 An individual prohibited from firearm possession
under § 922(g) can request “relief” from the AG by filing an application with
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).72 The
application must establish that the applicant will not act in a “manner
dangerous to public safety” nor will the relief be “contrary to the public
interest.”73 If satisfied by the individual’s showing, the AG is then enabled
by the statute to grant the relief and restore that individual’s Second
Amendment rights.74
In practice, however, this option has not been available for almost thirty
years because Congress has consistently eliminated funding for this
restoration process in its yearly appropriations starting in 1992.75 Congress
justified this funding elimination by explaining in 1992 that the restoration
process was a “very difficult task” that requires “many hours [spent]
investigating a particular applicant” and then venturing a “guess” whether he
or she “can be entrusted with a firearm.”76 The House concluded that the
“$3.75 million and the 40 man-years annually” is best used for “fighting
violent crime” instead of “investigating and acting upon these
applications.”77 It again addressed the funding in 1996 and added that “too
many” individuals with restored Second Amendment rights “went on to

69. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2012).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 925(c).
72. In 2002, the AG was given authority to grant relief pursuant to § 925(c). Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1112(e), 116 Stat. 2135, 2276 (replacing
“Secretary [of the Treasury]” with “Attorney General” in §§ 921 to 923, 925, and 926).
Notably, the AG has delegated authority to the ATF to act on § 925(c), among other tasks. 28
C.F.R. § 0.13(a) (2017).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
74. Id.
75. See WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44686, GUN CONTROL: FY2017
APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES (ATF)
AND OTHER INITIATIVES 23 (2017) (“For FY1993 and every year thereafter, Congress included
a proviso in the ATF S&E appropriations language that prevents that agency from using
appropriations to consider applications for disabilities relief (i.e., reinstatement of an
applicant’s right to gun ownership) from individuals who are otherwise ineligible to be
transferred a firearm.”); Is There a Way for a Prohibited Person to Restore His or Her Right
to Receive or Possess Firearms and Ammunition?, ATF (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/there-way-prohibited-person-restore-his-or-her-rightreceive-or-possess-firearms-and [https://perma.cc/MM8X-BG37].
76. H.R. REP. NO. 102-618, at 14 (1992).
77. Id.
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commit violent crimes with firearms.”78 This prohibition on funding has
meant that applications for relief under § 925(c) “cannot be acted upon.”79
Despite “legislative grace” only providing pardons, expungement, or the
defunded application process, individuals have turned to courts post-Heller
to restore their Second Amendment rights in as-applied challenges to
§ 922(g)(1).80
B. Heller and McDonald: Chaos Created
In 2008, the Court undertook its first “in-depth examination of the Second
Amendment” in Heller.81 There, Dick Heller challenged82 a thirty-two-yearold District of Columbia (D.C.) law banning handgun possession.83 In a 5 to
4 decision, the Court held that the D.C. handgun ban violated the individual’s
right to defend one’s home and that this right is at the Second Amendment’s
“core.”84 With self-defense at the Second Amendment’s core, the Court
stated that certain policy issues, including an absolute handgun ban in the
home, are not permissible.85 The Court based its decision on a statutory and
historical analysis of the Second Amendment.86
This Note does not assert an opinion on the Court’s analysis in Heller and
instead focuses on what the decision lacks. The Court acknowledges that
Heller is incomplete, noting that it does not “clarify the entire field” nor
provide “utter certainty” for Second Amendment jurisprudence just as its first
in-depth case concerning the Free Exercise Clause did not clarify all of First
Amendment jurisprudence.87
Three portions of Heller are so vague that they have caused pervasive
disagreement in the circuits. The first issue arises in the Court’s deferral of
a complete analysis of Second Amendment jurisprudence on the ground that
“there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications” for
evaluating other firearm regulations.88 Without providing guidance on how
to evaluate firearm regulations, Heller left the “formidable task of defining
the scope of permissible regulations” to the lower courts.89 Federal courts
78. H.R. REP. NO. 104-183, at 15 (1994).
79. Is There a Way for a Prohibited Person to Restore His or Her Right to Receive or
Possess Firearms and Ammunition?, supra note 75; see also United States v. Bean, 537 U.S.
71, 75–76 (2002) (stating that inaction by the ATF on § 925(c) applications “does not invest
a district court with independent jurisdiction to act on an application”).
80. See Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 9.
81. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
82. Id. at 575.
83. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 942 (4th ed.
2011).
84. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
767–68 (2010) (summarizing the Court’s analysis of the Second Amendment in Heller).
85. Heller, 554 U.S. at 602.
86. See id. at 576–627.
87. See id. at 635 (“[O]ne should not expect [Heller] to clarify the entire field [of Second
Amendment jurisprudence], any more than . . . [the Court’s] first in-depth Free Exercise
Clause case . . . left that area in a state of utter certainty.”).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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have tried to undertake this task, in part, by focusing on the phrase “historical
justifications,” believing it provided a clue into how the Court would
eventually evaluate other firearms regulations.90
Heller’s second problem is that it does not explicitly declare which
standard of constitutional scrutiny to use when evaluating a Second
Amendment challenge.91 Such guidance is important because the three
standards result in different levels of review and deference.92 The rational
basis test provides the greatest level of judicial deference and results in a law
being upheld if it is “rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”93
Under the rational basis test, the challenger must prove that the law does not
serve any conceivable legitimate purpose or is not a reasonable way to
achieve that end.94 The next analytical tier is intermediate scrutiny, which
asks if the law is “substantially related to an important government
purpose.”95 Strict scrutiny is the most exacting level of review, which only
allows a law to be upheld if “it is necessary to achieve a compelling
government purpose.”96 Here, the government must show that the law is the
“least restrictive or least discriminatory alternative” to meet the necessary
interest.97 As this suggests, strict scrutiny is a difficult test to surmount,
resulting in many laws examined under this test being deemed
unconstitutional.98 Not surprisingly, the standard chosen to evaluate the
constitutionality of a law is likely outcome determinative—meaning the law
is likely to be upheld under rational basis and likely not under strict
scrutiny.99
In Heller, the Court held that the D.C. handgun ban failed constitutional
muster “under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights.”100 However, this reference to “any”
standard of scrutiny was particularly concerning to Justice Breyer, who
devoted the third part of his dissent to a lack of guidance on the standards of
scrutiny.101 Breyer rejected the Court’s assertion that the D.C. law would be
90. See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Heller does not
catalogue the facts we must consider when reviewing a felon’s as-applied challenge. Rather,
the Supreme Court has noted that it will ‘expound upon the historical justifications for
exceptions [it] mentioned if and when those exceptions come before [it].’ Thus, to evaluate
Barton’s as-applied challenge, we look to the historical pedigree of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). . . .”
(first and second alterations in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635)); see also infra Part
III.C.
91. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (stating that the D.C. handgun ban would “fail
constitutional muster” under “any of the standards of scrutiny”).
92. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
93. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 83, at 552–53.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 553.
96. Id. at 554.
97. Id.
98. See id. (“Strict scrutiny, of course, is the most intensive type of judicial review, and
laws generally are declared unconstitutional when it is applied. Professor Gerald Gunther said
that it is ‘strict in theory and fatal in fact.’”).
99. See id.
100. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
101. See id. at 687–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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unconstitutional under any standard, pointing first to the law’s “‘legitimate’
life-saving objective” as enough to survive the rational basis test.102 Breyer
next stated that strict scrutiny cannot be adopted because if it were, the
constitutionality of many longstanding prohibitions—including “forfeiture
by criminals of the Second Amendment right”—would be “far from clear.”103
Breyer ultimately suggested an interest balancing test,104 which the Court
rejected.105 The Court did, however, agree with Breyer’s concerns, stating
in footnote twenty-seven that rational basis analysis is not the proper
standard.106 In fact, the Court noted that under rational basis, the Second
Amendment would be ineffective and “redundant with the separate
constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws.”107 Beyond that, the Court did
not elaborate beyond stating that something more than rational basis is
required.108 Thus, federal courts in post-Heller challenges have largely
settled on intermediate scrutiny since strict scrutiny and rational basis were
questioned by Justice Breyer and the Court respectively.109
A third example of important yet unsubstantiated language in Heller—
which is perhaps the most significant for this Note—is a footnote that states
that certain longstanding prohibitions on firearms, including § 922(g)(1), are
“presumptively lawful”110 infringements on an individual’s Second
Amendment rights.111 As noted, Justice Breyer cited examples of the laws
that the Court had noted would be permissible—the same regulations called
“presumptively lawful”112—as proof that the standard of review cannot be
strict scrutiny.113 Additionally, the Court stated that the laws that prohibit
possession of certain weapons, such as sawed-off shotguns, are
permissible.114 These presumptively lawful prohibitions are affirmed again
in the final paragraphs of the decision, which stated that D.C. must permit
Heller to register his handgun and keep it in his home “assuming that [he] is
not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights.”115 Yet, as
Breyer noted, the Court did not provide reasons or justifications as to why

102. Id. at 687–88.
103. Id. at 688.
104. See id. at 689.
105. See id. at 634–35 (majority opinion).
106. See id. at 628 n.27.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 6.
110. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
111. Id. at 626–27 (stating that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons”); see also United States v.
Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause Heller requires that we ‘presume,’ under
most circumstances, that felon dispossession statutes regulate conduct which is unprotected
by the Second Amendment, Barton’s facial challenge [to § 922(g)(1)] must fail.”).
112. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
113. Id. at 688–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
114. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (upholding a law prohibiting
the possession of sawed-off shotguns).
115. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (majority opinion).
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these “presumptively lawful” provisions would survive Second Amendment
scrutiny.116
Two years after Heller, the Court held in McDonald that the Second
Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus,
applies to state and local governments.117 The Court stated that its decisions
in Heller and McDonald do not “imperil every law regulating firearms” or
suggest that the Second Amendment is absolute, again noting the list of
presumptively lawful prohibitions articulated in Heller.118 However, the
Court again failed to establish why these presumptively lawful regulations
are permissible, with Justice Breyer again asking, “but why these rules and
not others?”119
C. Presumptively Lawful: Facial Challenges to § 922(g)(1)
In his Heller dissent, Justice Stevens lamented the Court’s “announcement
of a new constitutional right,” which “upsets [the] settled understanding” of
Second Amendment jurisprudence while “leav[ing] for future cases the
formidable task of defining the scope of permissible regulations.”120 As
Stevens warned, “two ‘waves’ of litigations” followed Heller and McDonald
that questioned “settled” laws.121
This Part examines how courts undertook the “formidable” task of
addressing the “waves” of Second Amendment challenges. Part I.C.1 looks
at the first wave of post-Heller litigation of facial challenges to longstanding
prohibitions like § 922(g)(1), particularly in the Third Circuit. Part I.C.2 then
analyzes the Third Circuit’s decision in Binderup, the first successful asapplied challenge to § 922(g)(1). This Part also highlights the pervasive
disagreement among the circuits about as-applied challenges to the statute.
1. Casting No Doubt: Unsuccessful Facial Challenges
The first wave of litigation post-Heller dealt primarily with facial
challenges to sections of the Gun Control Act of 1968, including
§ 922(g)(1).122 As noted, federal courts had little guidance from the Court
on how to evaluate these challenges.123 The Third Circuit is credited with
creating the two-prong test in Marzzarella that has been largely used by
courts to analyze challenged firearm regulations and was later applied to

116. Id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that he was “puzzled” about the justifications
for the Court’s presumptively lawful prohibitions).
117. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
118. Id. at 786.
119. Id. at 925 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
120. Heller, 554 U.S. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 4.
122. See id. at 4–8.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Heller does not
catalogue the facts we must consider when reviewing a felon’s as-applied challenge.”); United
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 2010) (“But Heller did not purport to fully
define all the contours of the Second Amendment . . . and accordingly, much of the scope of
the right remains unsettled.”); see also supra Part I.B.
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challenges to § 922(g)(1).124 The Third Circuit ultimately upheld
Marzzarella’s § 922(k) conviction,125 which prohibits knowingly
transporting, receiving, selling, or possessing any firearm with its serial
number removed or altered.126 The Third Circuit created its test for Second
Amendment challenges by largely adopting tests similar to those used to
determine free speech issues under the First Amendment.127 It held that
Heller suggested a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges
by (1) asking whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct that
falls within the Second Amendment’s scope, and if so, (2) evaluating it under
“some form of means-end scrutiny.”128
The first prong of the Marzzarella test deals with the scope of the Second
Amendment. Looking to historical justification of the law based on the
language of Heller,129 the Third Circuit first asked whether possession of an
“unmarked” firearm in the home—which is prohibited by § 922(k)—is
protected by the Second Amendment.130 While noting the assertions in
Heller and McDonald that the Second Amendment’s rights are not unlimited,
the Third Circuit stated that the Second Amendment protects “the right of
law-abiding citizens to possess non-dangerous weapons for self-defense in
the home.”131 However, the Third Circuit held that unmarked firearms are
possibly included under the lawful prohibition on dangerous and unusual
weapons132 after comparing the law’s historical justifications to those
presumptively lawful prohibitions named in Heller.133 The Third Circuit
found it difficult to make a final determination on whether possessing an
unmarked firearm is protected by the Second Amendment,134 citing the lack
of guidance from Heller.135 Therefore, the Third Circuit stated that it could
not be certain whether possession of an unmarked firearm is protected and
proceeded to analyze the law under the second prong.136
The test’s second prong requires an analysis of the challenged law under a
level of scrutiny. Citing the absence of a prescribed standard in Heller, the
Third Circuit struggled to determine what level of scrutiny to use.137 It first
rejected the rational basis test based on footnote twenty-seven of Heller,
which indicates that a higher scrutiny than rational basis is required for a
124. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 4–5.
125. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 87.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2012).
127. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 n.4.
128. Id. at 89.
129. See id. at 92.
130. See id. at 89.
131. Id. at 92.
132. See id. at 95 (“Because a firearm with a serial number is equally effective as a firearm
without one, there would appear to be no compelling reason why a law-abiding citizen would
prefer an unmarked firearm.”).
133. Id. at 93 (“Section 922(k)’s prohibition of the possession of firearms with ‘removed,
obliterated, or altered’ serial numbers is one of those regulations unmentioned by Heller.”).
134. Id. at 94 (stating that it is possible that “Marzzarella’s conduct may still fall within the
Second Amendment”).
135. Id. at 92.
136. Id. at 95.
137. See id. at 95–97.
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Second Amendment challenge.138 It also rejected Marzzarella’s argument
that it should use strict scrutiny since the Second Amendment is a
fundamental constitutional right.139 Conceding that strict scrutiny likely
applies in some Second Amendment challenges, the Third Circuit looked to
First Amendment doctrine and explained that strict scrutiny does not
necessarily “apply automatically any time an enumerated right is
involved.”140 To underscore this point, the court cited examples of speech
for which different levels of scrutiny apply.141 Since the right to free speech
is an “undeniably enumerated fundamental right” that is “susceptible to
several standards of scrutiny, depending upon the type of law challenged and
the type of speech at issue,” the court found “no reason why the Second
Amendment would be any different.”142 The court’s reluctance to employ
this analysis is clear, particularly in footnote fifteen, where it noted that the
First Amendment is a useful tool but that a Second Amendment analysis
could differ.143
The Third Circuit compared the limited prohibition of § 922(k) to the
absolute prohibition from the D.C. handgun ban in Heller to establish that
§ 922(k) does not come close to the D.C. law’s “level of infringement” since
§ 922(k) allows for a person to possess any other lawful firearm as long as it
bears its original serial number.144 Because of its limited impact, the Third
Circuit believed that the law is a regulation rather than a prohibition; the court
would, therefore, evaluate it less stringently than the D.C. handgun ban in
Heller.145 Thus, the court ultimately settled on evaluating § 922(k) with
intermediate scrutiny, though it was “not free from doubt” about its
decision.146 Notably, it was so unsure of its decision to apply intermediate
scrutiny that it also applied strict scrutiny,147 which illustrates the judicial
confusion caused by Heller’s vague standards. The Third Circuit looked to
the historical justification and the legislative intent of the prohibition to find
that § 922(k) passed constitutional muster.148
One year later, in United States v. Barton,149 the Third Circuit heard a
challenge to § 922(g)(1).150 Unlike the law evaluated in Marzzarella,151 the
challenged statute in Barton was expressly enumerated as a “presumptively

138. See id. at 95–96.
139. See id. at 96–97.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 96.
142. Id. at 96–97.
143. See id. at 96 n.15.
144. Id. at 97.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 99.
148. See id. at 100–01.
149. 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011).
150. Id. at 169–70.
151. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 (“Heller’s identified exceptions all derived from historical
regulations, but it is not clear that pre-ratification presence is the only avenue to a categorical
exception. . . . Therefore, prudence counsels caution when extending these recognized
exceptions to novel regulations unmentioned by Heller.”).
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lawful” regulation in Heller and McDonald.152 As noted, the assertion of
“presumptive lawfulness” was not substantiated in Heller or McDonald.153
Agreeing with the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits,154 the Third Circuit held that
the “presumptive lawfulness” of § 922(g)(1) is not dicta.155 Because the
Heller decision was “made expressly contingent upon a determination that
Heller was not ‘disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment
rights,’”156 the Third Circuit held that the “presumptively lawful” language
was outcome determinative and thus not mere dicta.157 Therefore, the court
denied the facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) based on Heller’s assertion that the
federal courts “presume” that felon-in-possession prohibitions are valid
under the Second Amendment.158
The Third Circuit is not alone in holding that § 922(g)(1), on its face,
passes constitutional muster. In fact, ten other circuits have directly
addressed this question and all have upheld the statute’s constitutionality.159
Additionally, most circuits have adopted some variation of the Marzzarella
two-prong test when evaluating Second Amendment challenges.160 The
nature and process of the test varies among the circuits, however.161 For the
first step, some circuits use historical analysis to determine whether the
regulated conduct was within the scope of conduct anticipated by the

152. Barton, 633 F.3d at 171.
153. See supra notes 109–18 and accompanying text.
154. See United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]o
the extent that this portion of Heller limits the Court’s opinion to possession of firearms by
law-abiding and qualified individuals, it is not dicta.”); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d
1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Courts often limit the scope of their holdings, and such
limitations are integral to those holdings.”). The Third Circuit erred in Barton when it agreed
with the Second and Ninth Circuits but had cited the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits. Barton, 633
F.3d at 171. Indeed, the Second Circuit did not address § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality until
two years later. United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281, 281 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
155. Barton, 633 F.3d at 171.
156. Id. at 171–72 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 647 (2008)).
157. Id. at 172.
158. Id.
159. See Bogle, 717 F.3d at 281–82; Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989 (D.C. Cir.
2013); United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Joos, 638
F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 691–94 (7th Cir.
2010); United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010); Rozier, 598 F.3d at 770–71;
Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1114–15; United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir.
2009); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009). The First Circuit has
not directly addressed the question. However, it used the felon-in-possession prohibition to
determine the constitutionality of prohibition on those convicted of misdeamenor domestic
violence, which suggests that it does find the felon-possession prohibition to be constitutional.
United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2011).
160. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 & n.49 (2d Cir.
2015); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194–96 (5th Cir. 2012);
GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670
F.3d 1244, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703–04 (7th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680–83 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–05 (10th Cir. 2010).
161. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 5.
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Founders,162 while others hold that “exclusions” from the Second
Amendment scope “need not mirror limits that were on the books in 1791.”163
Most circuits have “preferred to assume” that the challenged laws deal with
conduct that is possibly protected by the Second Amendment, likely out of
caution based on Heller’s failure to “explain precisely the nature of [the]
conduct that fell within” the Second Amendment’s scope.164 Thus,
regardless of its belief that the law may deal with unprotected conduct, most
circuits proceed to step two, where they evaluate the law under a standard of
scrutiny.165 Like the Third Circuit, most circuits have applied intermediate
scrutiny at this step, except for “rare” occasions when a different standard
was used.166
2. Binderup: A Successful As-Applied Challenge
As previously noted, Second Amendment challenges have come in two
“‘waves’ of litigation.”167 The first wave dealt primarily with facial
challenges to firearm regulations brought by individuals charged, including
unsuccessful challenges to § 922(g)(1).168 The second wave has dealt with
as-applied challenges to firearm regulations, typically arising in civil actions
brought by individuals seeking to have their Second Amendment rights
restored.169 An as-applied challenge “does not contend that a law is
unconstitutional as written but that its application to a particular person under
particular circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right.”170
To better understand as-applied challenges, this Note briefly addresses the
manner in which regulations prohibit firearm possession. The Court in Heller
recognized at least two ways regulations can prohibit firearm possession:
(1) on “who” and (2) on “what.”171 In other words, the Court recognized the
longstanding limitations on possession by individuals convicted of felonies,
deemed mentally ill, or in sensitive places like schools—the “who”—and on
“dangerous and unusual weapons”—the “what.”172
The handgun ban invalidated in Heller dealt with the reason the right was
to be exercised, where the court ultimately found a fundamental right to
defend one’s home.173 In Barton, the defendant argued that his “for what
162. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 200–03; United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8,
15-16 (1st Cir. 2009).
163. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
164. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 6; see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
85, 101 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e hesitate to say Marzzarella’s possession of an unmarked firearm
in his home is unprotected conduct.”).
165. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 6.
166. Id. at 6–7.
167. Id. at 4.
168. See id. at 4–8; see also supra note 160.
169. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 4; see also United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168,
173 (3d Cir. 2011).
170. United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010).
171. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008); see also Barton, 633
F.3d at 175.
172. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
173. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 175.
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reason” challenge overcame his “who” prohibition; in other words, he argued
that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it stops him from exercising the
right to defend his home.174 However, the Third Circuit rejected this and
foreclosed any “for what reason” challenges by an individual who qualifies
for a “who” prohibition.175
Other circuits have also held that the first question to be asked in as-applied
challenges is “whether one is qualified to possess a firearm,” not the
individual’s reason for possessing the firearm.176 Thus, to mount a successful
as-applied challenge, an individual must show why the “who” prohibition
does not apply by “adequately distinguish[ing] [her or] his circumstances
from those of persons historically excluded from Second Amendment
protections.”177 In other words, in as-applied challenges, courts look to the
“particular circumstances” that would remove the specific challenging
individual from a statute’s “constitutional sweep.”178
As-applied challenges in the second wave of post-Heller litigation have
“[i]ronically”—as noted by the DOJ—been most successful when
challenging the statutes that the Heller Court considered presumptively
lawful, including the felon-in-possession prohibition.179 Though upholding
these prohibitions on their face, the Third Circuit in Barton stated that these
prohibitions, which were deemed “presumptively lawful,” seem to imply that
“the presumption may be rebutted” and thus not foreclosing as-applied
challenges.180
In Binderup, the Third Circuit became the first circuit—in a fractured
decision181—to restore the Second Amendment rights to two individuals in
as-applied challenges to an otherwise constitutional Second Amendment
prohibition.182 The two individuals—Daniel Binderup and Julio Suarez—
filed separate complaints in federal district courts arguing that § 922(g)(1)
did not apply to their convictions, and even if it did, that it was
unconstitutional as applied to them.183 The district courts found that
174. See id. at 174.
175. Id. at 175 (“Heller forecloses any as-applied challenge based on the manner in which
a felon wishes to exercise his Second Amendment rights.”).
176. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also
United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010).
177. Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847).
178. Id. at 346.
179. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 9 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008)).
180. Barton, 633 F.3d at 173 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26).
181. See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 339 n.1 (“Parts III.A–C.3.a preserve the Marzzarella
framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges and overrule aspects of Barton that
are inconsistent with it. Seven Judges join those Parts expressly. Chief Judge McKee and
Judges Shwartz and Restrepo, who join Judge Fuentes’s opinion, agree that Marzzarella
controls the Second Amendment analysis, but do not join any of Part III because they reject
the notion that the Marzzarella framework can be reconciled with any aspect of Barton’s asapplied Second Amendment analysis, which they would overrule entirely.”).
182. See id. at 339, 379–80.
183. Id. at 340. Binderup filed his complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and
Suarez filed his complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Id.
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§ 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied but used different methods to
support their rulings.184 The government appealed and the Third Circuit sua
sponte consolidated the cases for a hearing en banc.185 The Third Circuit
unanimously rejected Binderup and Suarez’s argument that their predicate
offenses—state misdemeanors—did not qualify as crimes for § 922(g)(1)
purposes.186 It noted that both predicate offenses are subject to a maximum
possible penalty exceeding one year and, thus, qualify as a “crime” for the
felon-in-possession prohibition.187 More important here, the Third Circuit
then established how an individual otherwise prohibited from firearm
possession can “rebut the presumption that [she or] he lacks Second
Amendment rights.”188 A majority of the Third Circuit agreed that
Marzzarella’s two-prong test should be used to guide the analysis, while a
separate majority agreed about what factors constitute each prong.189
Characterizing the Third Circuit in Binderup as fractured is an
understatement. First, only a slight majority concurred in judgment.190 Of
the fifteen judges, eight decided that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as
applied to Binderup and Suarez.191 The remaining seven judges believed that
§ 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied and further challenged the very
premise that as-applied challenges to the longstanding “presumptively
lawful” prohibitions, like § 922(g)(1), are even permissible.192 Second, there
was a split among the eight judges that upheld the as-applied challenge. Only
three judges who upheld the as-applied challenge agreed that a determination
of an offense’s seriousness dictates whether the challenge is successful, while
the other five believed that the determination should depend upon the
existence of “violence.”193 Third, the judges were further split by what test
to use in determining Second Amendment challenges. Seven judges held that
the framework for deciding as-applied challenges came from reading
Marzzarella and Barton together,194 four judges held that Barton alone
should be used,195 and the remaining three judges would have only used
Marzzarella.196 It is not surprising, then, that Judge Julio Fuentes, who
authored the dissent in judgment,197 warned that this fractured decision
184. See id. at 340–41.
185. See id. at 341.
186. Pursuant to § 922(g)(1), a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year” does not include “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a
misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(20)(b) (2012).
187. See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 342.
188. Id. at 339.
189. See id. at 339 & n.1.
190. Id.
191. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No.
16-847).
192. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 380, 401–07; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note
191, at 8.
193. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 356; id. at 357 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part).
194. See id. at 346–47 (majority opinion).
195. See id. at 365–66 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part).
196. See id. at 339 n.1 (majority opinion); supra note 181.
197. See id. at 380 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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lacked “any workable standards that would make such a regime
administratively feasible or doctrinally coherent” for district courts going
forward.198
Binderup contains three written opinions: (1) the opinion of the court
advocating a broad test, written by Judge Thomas L. Ambro, (2) a concurring
opinion advocating a narrower test written by Judge Thomas Hardiman, and
(3) a dissenting in judgment opinion, written by Judge Fuentes.199 The
Ambro opinion held that the framework for as-applied Second Amendment
challenges came from a collective reading of Marzzarella and Barton200 and
noted that any aspects of Barton that conflicted with Marzzarella were
overruled.201 In other words, the Third Circuit upheld Marzzarella’s twoprong test, with step one supplemented by the hurdles provided by Barton.202
At step one, the challenging individual must prove that the “presumptively
lawful regulation burdens his [or her] Second Amendment rights,” which
requires him or her to: (1) “identify the traditional justification for
excluding . . . the class of which he [or she] appears to be a member” from
Second Amendment protections and (2) “present facts about himself [or
herself] and his [or her] background that distinguish his [or her]
circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred class.”203
Here, the challenger must “rebut the presumptive lawfulness of the
exclusion,” which Ambro declared “no small task” and not “merely on [the
challenger’s] say-so.”204
Ambro defined § 922(g)(1)’s “historically barred class” as individuals
previously convicted of serious crimes.205 Looking to historical justification
for § 922(g)(1), Ambro found that the prohibition is “tied to the concept of a
virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm
‘unvirtuous citizens,’” which is “broader than violent criminals.”206 This
analysis was a break from Barton, which stated in a footnote that § 922(g)(1)
was meant to prohibit “criminals likely to commit a violent crime in the
future.”207 Ambro stated that this footnote from Barton “too narrowly”
defined § 922(g)(1)’s justification, which resulted in it “too broadly” defining
the class of potentially successful as-applied challenges to individuals
convicted of nonviolent crimes.208 Further, Ambro ruled against Barton’s
assertion that evidence of rehabilitation or likelihood of recidivism could be
used at step one and noted the difficulty in predicting whether an individual
198. Id.
199. See id. at 336–39 (majority opinion). For convenience, each of these opinions will be
referenced by name of the authoring judge.
200. See id. at 346–47.
201. See id. at 339 n.1.
202. See id. at 347.
203. Id. at 346–47.
204. Id. at 347.
205. Id. at 348–49.
206. Id. (citing United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010)). Ambro
noted that “several” circuits have endorsed this justification, including the First, Fourth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Id. at 348.
207. Id. at 347 n.3.
208. Id.
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is likely to commit a violent offense in the future.209 Therefore, the first step
is entirely an analysis of the “seriousness of the purportedly disqualifying
offense,” without focusing on the violence associated with that offense or a
consideration of the individual’s rehabilitation.210
The opinion does not cover how to determine “seriousness.” Instead,
Ambro provided a number of possible factors to consider that are sufficient,
but not necessary, such as maximum possible punishment,211 whether the
legislators enacted the offense as a misdemeanor,212 the use or attempted use
of force as an element,213 the length of the challenger’s sentence,214 and
whether other states “consider” the offense to be serious.215 If a court finds
that the predicate offense is not serious, then the individual “adequately
distinguished his circumstances from those of persons historically excluded
from Second Amendment protections.”216 The law is then evaluated under
“heightened scrutiny at step two,”217 settling on intermediate scrutiny.218
Hardiman—joined by four judges—agreed that § 922(g)(1) was
unconstitutional as applied to Binderup and Suarez.219 However, Hardiman
argues that Barton was correct in determining that the historical justification
for § 922(g)(1) was “tethered to the time-honored practice of keeping
firearms out of the hands of those likely to commit violent crimes.”220 As
such, Hardiman believed that § 922(g)(1) was “categorically
unconstitutional” when applied to “non-dangerous persons convicted of
offenses unassociated with violence” because it “eviscerates the core of
the[ir] Second Amendment right.”221 Therefore, Hardiman differed from
Ambro by asserting that challengers must distinguish themselves from those
with a “propensity for violence,” who were the historical target of the felonin-possession prohibition.222 He argued that step one should, thus, largely
look at whether the predicate offense involved “violence, force, or threat of
force,”223 in addition to considering the individual’s subsequent behavior
since the offense, which could affirm or disprove his or her “membership

209. Id. at 349–50.
210. Id. at 350.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 351–52 (“[A] state legislature’s classification of an offense as a
misdemeanor is a powerful expression of its belief that the offense is not serious enough to be
disqualifying . . . . This is not to say that state misdemeanors cannot be serious.”).
213. See id. at 352.
214. See id. (“[S]evere punishments are typically reserved for serious crimes . . . . With
not a single day of jail time, the punishments here reflect the sentencing judges’ assessment
of how minor the violations were.”).
215. Id. at 353 (“[B]ecause they have shown that there is no consensus regarding the
seriousness of their crimes, their showing at step one is that much more compelling.”).
216. Id. at 347.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 356.
219. See id. at 357 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part).
220. Id. at 362 (citing United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011)).
221. Id. at 358.
222. Id. at 375–76.
223. Id. at 376.
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among the class of responsible, law-abiding citizens” with Second
Amendment rights.224
In his dissent, Fuentes—joined by six other judges—questioned the
premise that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are permissible and argued
that if permissible, Binderup or Suarez would not qualify.225 Fuentes began
his analysis by looking at how other circuits have applied the Court’s “limited
guidance” from Heller to challenges of felon-in-possession prohibitions.226
No other circuit had upheld an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) and, in
fact, four circuits had found them to be impermissible.227
After providing the status of as-applied challenges among the sister
circuits, Fuentes concurred with Ambro about using the Marzzarella test and
analyzing a crime’s “seriousness” at step one.228 However, Fuentes stated
that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) would fail at step one of the test
because all “crimes currently within § 922(g)(1)’s scope are serious by
definition.”229 Fuentes noted that Congress has the power to require
individuals convicted of crimes to “forfeit any number of rights and
privileges” and that the prohibition on firearm possession is “a consequence
of [the individuals’] own unlawful conduct.”230 Fuentes also stated that even
if as-applied challenges could be permitted for some firearm regulations,
there can be laws where “such challenges must fail in the face of reasonable
deference to legislative judgments,” pointing to First Amendment
jurisprudence.231 Referring to United Public Workers of America v.
Mitchell,232 Fuentes pointed out that Congress does indeed have the power
to “impose a complete ban on the exercise of a constitutional right by a
category of persons who, in its reasonable estimation, pose a threat to the
public,” thus supporting the complete ban on firearm possession for
individuals convicted of felonies.233
Fuentes further opined that the problems with as-applied challenges are
insurmountable because any bright-line analysis is “practically impossible”
and the determination cannot be made “with any degree of confidence.”234
To illustrate this, Fuentes pointed to Congress’s decision to defund the AG’s
administrative regime for providing individualized exceptions to the
224. Id.
225. See id. at 380–81 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226. Id. at 381.
227. See id. at 381–82. Part III.A further examines how other circuits have determined asapplied challenges in a discussion of Binderup’s constitutionality. See infra Part III.A.
228. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 387.
229. Id. at 388.
230. Id. at 380–81.
231. Id. at 403–04.
232. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). In Mitchell, the Court held that a mechanic at the U.S. Mint was
not successful in an as-applied challenge to the Hatch Act, which bans government employees
from engaging in certain kinds of partisan political activity. See id. at 101. The Court did not
agree with the mechanic’s argument that he was different from “administrative workers” who
“may be barred, constitutionally, from political management and political campaigns,” and
further stated that these “matters of details” are “for Congress, not for the courts.” Id. at 102.
233. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 404.
234. Id. at 402.
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prohibitions allowed under § 925(c).235 Fuentes highlighted Congress’s
evaluation of “evidence from its prior regime” that these individual
evaluations—which were “in effect, as-applied challenges”—were
“unworkable.”236 Specifically, he cited a 1992 Senate report, which stated
that the system was “too prone to error” and could result in “devastating
consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made.”237
Fuentes concluded that Congress’s decision to defund the application process
shows that as-applied challenges are untenable due to the possibility of
“potentially fatal” errors.238
Additionally, Fuentes pointed to a number of federal court cases brought
after Congress stopped funding § 925(c),239 including United States v.
Bean.240 In Bean, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts were not
forced to review the individual applications after Congress ceased funding
such review.241 In its analysis, the Court stated that “an inquiry into that
applicant’s background” is “best performed by the Executive” because an
agency, “unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for conducting a neutral,
wide-ranging investigation.”242 Noting that this decision was pre-Heller,243
Fuentes nonetheless implored the Third Circuit to heed Bean’s warnings of
“pitfalls inherent in a regime of as-applied challenges.”244
Fuentes’s most significant—and concluding—concern echoed Justices
Stevens and Breyer in their Heller and McDonald dissents. Fuentes warned
that this decision will “saddle district court judges”245 with an “extraordinary
administrative burden”246 without providing any “workable standards” for
determining an as-applied challenge’s constitutionality.247 Echoing the
Court in Heller, the Third Circuit leaves it to “future cases to explain more
fully how to weigh and balance” factors in the Binderup test.248 Fuentes
warned that “it will only be a matter of time before void-for-vagueness
challenges to § 922(g)(1) start to percolate throughout” the Third Circuit.249
Thus, in addition to concerns over the permissibility of as-applied challenges,
Fuentes expressed concern about the test itself.

235.
236.
237.
(1992).
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 402–03; see also Part I.A.2.
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 403.
Id. The House Report echoes similar concerns. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-618, at 14
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 403.
See id. at 407–09.
537 U.S. 71 (2002).
Id. at 77–78.
Id. at 77.
See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 408 n.209.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 411.
Id.
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II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVALIDITY: JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES
Fuentes’s warning of void-for-vagueness challenges alluded to
Johnson,250 which settled a pervasive disagreement among the circuits
concerning the residual clause of the ACCA.251 That disagreement is similar
to the issues present in the as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), including
Binderup. Part II.A provides a brief overview of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine. Part II.B analyzes Johnson with a focus on the similarities between
the Court’s issues with the residual clause and those with as-applied
challenges.
A. Void for Vagueness: Overview
Primarily used in First Amendment challenges, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine has been described by the Court as assessing whether a statute
“forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague” that it necessitates
a “guess at its meaning and differ[s] as to its application.”252 The Court has
only used the doctrine to invalidate a criminal law five times since the
1960s.253 The fifth and most recent is Johnson. Applying the void-forvagueness doctrine in Johnson, the Court explained that a criminal law is
unconstitutional if it is “so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair
notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary
enforcement.”254 Ambiguity in criminal law, particularly if it does not
provide minimal guidelines for enforcement, can result in unjust punishment
and selective prosecution.255
B. Johnson v. United States
In Johnson, the Court held that the residual clause of the ACCA—called
by a federal public defender as “the most contentious 14 words in a criminal
statute in recent years”—was unconstitutionally vague.256 The ACCA,
which the DOJ called a longstanding tool to “achieve prolonged incarceration
of armed violent offenders,”257 increases the penalties for individuals
convicted under § 922(g)(1) if they have had three or more earlier convictions
for “serious drug offense[s]” or “violent felon[ies].”258
Under the ACCA, a predicate offense qualifies as a “violent felony” if it
(1) falls within an element clause, which means it “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another”;259 (2) “is burglary, arson, extortion, or an offense involving the use
250. Id.
251. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015).
252. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
253. Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 698 (2017).
254. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.
255. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 83, at 970.
256. Katherine Menendez, Johnson v. United States: Don’t Go Away, CRIM. JUST., Spring
2016, at 12, 13.
257. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, § 1032.
258. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).
259. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
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of explosives”;260 or (3) falls within the residual clause, which includes any
felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another.”261
Should the predicate offenses qualify under the ACCA, there is a
mandatory increase from a ten-year maximum sentence under § 922(g)(1) to
a fifteen-year minimum sentence and a maximum sentence of life,262 even if
the judge finds the resulting sentence unjust or excessive.263 In fiscal year
2016, 305 individuals received an ACCA enhancement and their average
sentence was fifteen years;264 this was ten years more than the average
sentence for a § 922(g)(1) violation.265 Thus, the determination of a “serious
drug offense” or a “violent felony” is significant.
Prior to Johnson, the Court had undertaken multiple examinations of the
ACCA, including in Taylor v. United States.266 In Taylor, the Court
addressed whether a particular state conviction for burglary qualified as a
“burglary” pursuant to the ACCA.267 To determine if a predicate offense
qualifies under the ACCA, the Court endorsed the categorical approach,
whereby courts look to the predicate offense’s statutory elements as opposed
to the particular individual’s conduct underlying the conviction.268 Taylor,
thus, rejected “mini-trials” where sentencing judges undergo a fact-specific
analysis for each individual.269 This element-specific categorical approach
was to be used in assessing predicate offenses for the ACCA, including under
the residual clause.270
The Court also dealt specifically with the residual clause before Johnson,
granting certiorari in four cases from 2007 to 2015.271 In each case, the Court
addressed the inclusion of different predicate offenses under the residual
clause and applied a slightly different test each time.272 Another feature of
these four cases was the repeated objections of Justices Antonin Scalia and
Alito over the lack of clarity and consistency in the residual clause analysis
and the Court’s previous decisions.273
260. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
261. Id.
262. See id.; see also Carlton F. Gunn, So Many Crimes, So Little Time: The Categorical
Approach to the Characterization of a Prior Conviction Under the Armed Career Criminal
Act, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 66, 66 (1994).
263. Menendez, supra note 256, at 12.
264. Quick Facts: Felon in Possession of a Firearm, supra note 11.
265. Id.
266. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
267. Id. at 600–01; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
268. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–01.
269. Gunn, supra note 262, at 66.
270. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
271. Id. at 2554 (citing Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011); Chambers v. United
States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); James v. United
States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007)).
272. Id. at 2558.
273. See Sykes, 564 U.S. at 28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As was perhaps predictable, instead
of producing a clarification of the Delphic residual clause, today’s opinion produces a fourth
ad hoc judgment that will sow further confusion. . . . We should admit that ACCA’s residual
provision is a drafting failure and declare it void for vagueness.”); Chambers, 555 U.S. at 133
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Ultimately, in 2015, the Court invalidated the residual clause in Johnson
in an opinion written, unsurprisingly, by Justice Scalia.274 The Court held
that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause was
unconstitutional because of the “indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry”
required to determine if a predicate offense qualified as a “violent felony”
under the clause.275 In particular, the Court identified two features of the
residual clause that “conspire to make it unconstitutionally vague.”276 First,
the categorical approach required that courts use a “judicially imagined
‘ordinary case’” to estimate the risk of the crime instead of “real-world facts
or statutory elements.”277 The Court expressed deep concern with the “grave
uncertainty” about how the judges would estimate the risk of the crime,
asking—perhaps sarcastically—if the judge should look to “statistical
analysis,” “a survey,” “expert evidence,” “Google,” or “gut instinct.”278
Second, the courts ask if the “judge-imagined abstraction” of the ordinary
crime involved “serious potential risk,” which was an equally vague
notion.279 The Court held that these two features conspire to create “arbitrary
enforcement by judges.”280 Taken together, the Court held that the
application of the residual clause to enhance one’s sentence denied due
process.281
The Court was not persuaded that the residual clause was constitutional
merely because there are “straightforward cases” in which a predicate offense
“clearly pose[s] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”282
Pointing to precedent, the Court rejected the argument that a statute is
constitutional “merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within
the provision’s grasp.”283 The Court did not accept that “some obviously
risky crimes” establish that the residual clause is constitutional.284 Further,
the Court rejected the government’s argument that courts should look to the
individual’s conduct rather than employ the categorical approach.285 The
Court affirmed the importance of Taylor and noted the “utter impracticability
(Alito, J., concurring) (“ACCA’s residual clause is nearly impossible to apply consistently.
Indeed, the ‘categorical approach’ to predicate offenses has created numerous splits among
the lower federal courts . . . .”); Begay, 553 U.S. at 154 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“But I can do
no more than guess as to whether drunk driving poses a more serious risk than burglary, and I
will not condemn a man to a minimum of 15 years in prison on the basis of such speculation.”);
James, 550 U.S. at 216 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Imprecision and indeterminacy are
particularly inappropriate in the application of a criminal statute. Years of prison hinge on the
scope of ACCA’s residual provision, yet its boundaries are ill defined.”).
274. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.; see also James, 550 U.S. at 211.
278. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (citing United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
279. Id. at 2558.
280. Id. at 2557.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 2560.
283. Id. at 2561.
284. Id. (emphasis omitted).
285. Id. at 2562.
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of requiring” a court to “reconstruct” an individual’s conduct “long after the
original conviction.”286 Ultimately, the residual clause was doomed by the
need to apply two vague standards—“serious potential risk” and “idealized
ordinary case”—that the Court found resulted in “arbitrary enforcement.”287
The Court acknowledged its multiple past attempts to establish a standard
test for the residual clause and cited these “persistent efforts” as proof of
vagueness.288 Pointing to inconsistencies and splits among the lower federal
courts, the Court highlighted that “pervasive disagreement” in the lower court
about “the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to conduct and the kinds of
factors one is supposed to consider.”289 The Court called the general
confusion and lack of consistency unavoidable and inconsistent with due
process: “Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison
for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee of due
process.”290
III. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE BINDERUP TEST
A decade after Heller, the Court has yet to “clarify the entire field” of
Second Amendment jurisprudence or “expound upon the historical
justifications” for the “presumptively lawful” prohibitions—as it said it
would.291 Two particular areas of concern have arisen as federal courts seek
to respond to the post-Heller challenges: (1) the permissibility of as-applied
challenges to the enumerated presumptively lawful prohibitions and (2) the
constitutionality of the tests created by the circuits to respond to challenges.
Part III.A addresses the permissibility of as-applied challenges, while Part
III.B highlights the Binderup test to show constitutional concerns with the
current state of as-applied challenges.
A. Are As-Applied Challenges Permissible?
As noted, the Court in Heller stated that the individual right to keep and
bear arms is not unlimited, and certain “longstanding prohibitions” are
“presumptively lawful.”292 Two years later, the Court “repeat[ed] those
assurances” that Heller does not “cast doubt” on the longstanding
prohibitions.293 This contention is not further elaborated on; instead, the
Court noted that it will “expound upon the historical justifications for the
exceptions” mentioned.294 Federal courts, then, were forced to decide what
“presumptively lawful” means. The three-judge panel of the Third Circuit in
Barton, for example, understood “presumptively lawful” as an implication
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id. at 2557–58.
Id. at 2558 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 91 (1921)).
Id. at 2560.
Id.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
Id. at 627 n.26.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
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“that the presumption may be rebutted,” thus opening up the courts to asapplied challenges to the longstanding prohibitions enumerated in Heller.295
The seven dissenting judges in Binderup were not in consensus with the
Barton panel—or the eight judges upholding the as-applied challenge in
Binderup—on this matter. They critiqued the treatment of the word
“presumptively” in Heller “as though it requires courts to consider as-applied
challenges to the felon-in-possession ban.”296
Five other circuits agreed with the Binderup dissenters and held that asapplied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are not permissible. Instead of focusing on
the word “presumptively,” the Fifth,297 Sixth,298 Ninth,299 Tenth,300 and
Eleventh301 Circuits have focused on Heller’s assertion that it does not cast
doubt on prohibitions like § 922(g)(1). Additionally, the Second Circuit did
not expressly state whether as-applied challenges are permissible but did hold
§ 922(g)(1) constitutional in United States v. Bogle302 without distinguishing
between facial and as-applied challenges.303
The First Circuit has not expressly foreclosed as-applied challenges, but it
has “expressed skepticism” about them.304 In United States v. TorresRosario,305 the First Circuit noted the potential for “serious problems of
administration, consistency and fair warning” in as-applied challenges, but
nonetheless stated that it may be open to them.306
The four remaining circuits—the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C.
Circuits307—have stated that as-applied challenges are permissible, but have
not yet upheld any, citing the challenging individual’s failure to distinguish

295. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011).
296. Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 394 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Fuentes,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323
(2017) (No. 16-847).
297. See United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010).
298. See United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010). Notably, the Sixth
Circuit recently remanded an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(4), which prohibited possession
of a firearm by individuals who have been committed to a mental institution. Tyler v. Hillsdale
Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2016). The district court was instructed to
apply intermediate scrutiny to determine the statute’s constitutionality as applied. Id. at 699.
It noted that it would not rely on Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language for § 922(g)(4), as
it did in Carey, in a challenge to § 922(g)(1). Id. at 688. Thus, while Tyler is certainly relevant,
the circuit did not suggest that the decision means any change to its view on as-applied
challenges to § 922(g)(1).
299. See United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
300. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009).
301. See United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
302. 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
303. See id. at 281–82.
304. Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 384 (3d Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Fuentes,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the First Circuit’s position on asapplied challenges to § 922(g)(1)), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847).
305. 658 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2011).
306. Id. at 113.
307. See United States v. Woolsey, 759 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014); Schrader v. Holder,
704 F.3d 980, 990–91 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir.
2012); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010).
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his or herself to the court’s satisfaction.308 The Fourth Circuit, for example,
acknowledged that there could be a successful as-applied challenge under the
right circumstances but held that the fact that the predicate offense is
nonviolent does not, alone, result in a successful as-applied challenge.309
Thus, in addition to disagreements about the test for evaluating post-Heller
Second Amendment challenges,310 there is a more troubling and deep split
over whether as-applied challenges to the enumerated longstanding
prohibitions like § 922(g)(1) are even allowed. The Court needs to keep the
promise it made in Heller to evaluate presumptively lawful prohibitions like
§ 922(g)(1). In particular, it needs to clarify whether they are susceptible to
as-applied challenges.
B. The Problems with Binderup
Should the Court hold that as-applied challenges are permissible, it must
evaluate the two-step test set forth in Binderup.311 The question at step two
is rather simple: what level of scrutiny should the courts apply when
evaluating the challenged laws? There is consensus among the circuits that
intermediate scrutiny is the proper level based on their reading of Heller;312
the Court needs to confirm whether this consensus is correct.
Step one, however, has more to address. The Third Circuit used “historical
justifications” because of the note in Heller, in which the Court stated it
would “expound upon the historical justifications” for the longstanding
prohibitions.313 The federal courts have decided that this language—
“historical justification”—dictates a key facet for evaluating Second
Amendment restrictions.314
First, the Court needs to confirm that the examination of historical
justification is, in fact, the test that courts should use. Second, the Court, as
promised, should expound on the justification for § 922(g)(1) as a
presumptively lawful regulation and in doing so create a standard rationale
for why that prohibition is lawful. The Court promised that there would be
time enough for it to undergo this analysis, and, now that a circuit has upheld
the first successful as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), the issue is ripe for
discussion.
Binderup, which upheld that first successful challenge, is itself susceptible
to constitutional concerns. There are at least three significant similarities
between the issues settled by Johnson and those present in Binderup: (1) the
federal courts rightly are uncertain about how to apply the Court’s decision,

308. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 385 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (describing the Fourth, Seventh,
Eighth, and D.C. Circuits’ positions on as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1)).
309. See United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that
“application of the felon-in-possession prohibition to allegedly non-violent felons . . . does not
violate the Second Amendment”).
310. See supra Part I.C.2.
311. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 356; see supra notes 200–04.
312. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
313. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
314. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
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which has resulted in disagreement among and within the circuits; (2) due to
no bright-line rules, judges must create abstraction of the ordinary crime to
determine if the crime is violent pursuant to the ACCA, or serious pursuant
to Binderup; and (3) a “shapeless” provision315 is infringing on fundamental
rights, particularly the right to bear arms and the constitutional prohibition
on excessive punishment. Similar to Johnson, the vague standards of
Binderup “conspire”316 to make the test unconstitutional. In both the preJohnson cases and in Binderup, standards to assess whether a predicate
offense qualifies under a statute largely rely on an individual judge’s
interpretation, resulting in “indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry.”317
In Binderup, it is not clear how to determine whether a predicate offense
constitutes a “serious” crime. As Judge Fuentes noted in his dissent, the
absence of rules for determining a crime’s “seriousness” means that “the
judge’s views about the offense and the offender” could determine the
outcome of a case,318 potentially resulting in different holdings for the same
predicate offense. An evaluation of “seriousness” would likely fail under an
application of Johnson’s reasoning to this test.
Further, the Court in Johnson found evidence of vagueness in “pervasive
disagreement” among lower courts about the “nature of the inquiry one is
supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.”319
In as-applied challenges, the circuits are split over what factors to consider,
what historical justification to rely on, what presumptions are rebuttable,
what level of constitutional scrutiny to employ, and whether as-applied
challenges are even permissible. This level of disagreement should warrant
an examination of as-applied challenges by the Supreme Court.
The Court has already expressed its disdain for judges looking at the
particular facts of a past criminal conviction in Taylor, where it required
courts to evaluate predicate offenses under the categorical approach for the
ACCA.320 Without the categorical approach, courts risk undertaking “minitrials” that “reconstruct” an individual’s conduct “long after the original
conviction.”321 Based on the limited guidance provided by the Third Circuit
in Binderup, it seems possible that district judges will be forced to conduct
these “mini-trials” since the analysis of the predicate offense is not limited to
the elements of the underlying offense.322 As the Court noted in Johnson,
underlying Taylor is its belief that these “mini-trials” are tarnished by their
“utter impracticability” and, thus, should not be permitted.323 The Binderup

315. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
318. Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 410 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Fuentes,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323
(2017) (No. 16-847).
319. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015).
320. See supra notes 246–49 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Part I.C.2.
323. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562.
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test, as it stands, potentially invalidates the belief underlying Taylor and
should be addressed by the Court.
IV. RESOLUTION
To resolve the pervasive disagreement over the nature and permissibility
of as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), there are two primary options: (1) a
statutory fix or (2) a judicial fix. Part IV.A provides options for a statutory
fix by Congress, should it choose to act. Part IV.B reiterates the need for the
Supreme Court to address as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) and notes the
potential equal protection issues resulting from a fundamental right that
hinges on the circuit in which a person resides.
A. Statutory Fix
Should Congress agree with some circuits that there are predicate offenses
that should no longer result in a prohibition under § 922(g)(1), it can amend
§ 921(a)(20) to provide more offense-specific clarification of what felonies
and state misdemeanors fall within the meaning of “crime” in the statute.
Currently, the statute states that offenses pertaining to “antitrust violations,
unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to
the regulation of business practices” do not result in the prohibition on
possessing a firearm.324 Thus, it is not unprecedented for Congress to exempt
certain offenses from § 922(g)(1). Congress can either add other offenses
that are exempted from the felon-in-possession prohibition or, alternatively,
provide a list of offenses that should result in the prohibition. This option,
however, could result in further questions about whether the lists of
enumerated offenses are exhaustive and whether appeals are permitted for
offenses not provided on any affirmative list. Additionally, this fix would be
limited to the enumerated offenses, without addressing the test for those not
listed.
Should Congress wish to limit as-applied challenges in the courts, it could
amend the language about “what constitutes a conviction” under
§ 921(a)(20). Currently, the statute provides that any conviction that has
been “expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has
had civil rights restored” is not a conviction under the prohibition.325
Congress could add an express declaration that other than these enumerated
exceptions, an individual’s Second Amendment rights cannot be restored.
Additionally, but unlikely, Congress could begin providing funds to the
AG to undertake individual evaluations for rights restoration under § 925(c).
Congress stopped funding the program in 1992, concluding that it was a
difficult and subjective task prone to errors.326 Additionally, the Court in
Bean questioned whether the judiciary had the ability to make individual
evaluations of this nature.327 Thus, Congress may decide to re-fund the AG’s
324.
325.
326.
327.

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A) (2012).
Id. § 921(a)(20)(B).
See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74, 233–44 and accompanying text.
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evaluation program if it shares the Bean Court’s concerns about the judiciary
making such decisions. Re-funding the program, however, still would
require resolution about how the federal courts should handle these asapplied challenges since individuals denied by the AG are able to appeal the
ruling to the district courts.328 Yet Congress’s consistent decision over thirty
years to not fund the program means that a reversal on whether it should fund
§ 925(c) is unlikely.
B. Judicial Fix
Regardless of whether or how Congress acts, the Court needs to clarify
issues regarding § 922(g)(1) as-applied challenges. Particularly, it needs to
address two overarching concerns: (1) the permissibility of as-applied
challenges to the enumerated presumptively lawful prohibitions and (2) the
constitutionality of the tests created by the circuits to respond to challenges.
The Court can address the permissibility of as-applied challenges by
granting certiorari in such a case and determining whether § 922(g)(1) falls
within Congress’s power to impose a complete ban on the exercise of a
constitutional right by a class of individuals, as it did in Mitchell.329 In other
words, it can uphold a per se felon-in-possession prohibition. It also could
hold that as-applied challenges are permitted.
A determination about the permissibility of an as-applied challenge is
necessary based on the nature of the circuit split. Without the Court’s
interference, it currently stands that individuals previously convicted of an
offense in the Third Circuit could potentially have their Second Amendment
rights restored, while individuals who committed the same offense in the
Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, or Eleventh Circuits cannot.330 This gives rise to a
potential equal protection problem, with a person’s fundamental rights
determined by where they live.
Should the Court uphold the possibility of as-applied challenges, it next
needs to clarify the factors and test that federal courts should use in analyzing
such challenges. The disparities among—and within—the circuits should be
settled by the Court, particularly whether the challenges are limited to
individuals with predicate offenses that are “non-violent” or “nonserious.”331 For example, within the Third Circuit, there is a split among the
judges over what factors are relevant to determine as-applied challenges, with
seven judges pointing to “seriousness” of the predicate offense and five
judges pointing to the “violence” associated with the predicate offense. The
Court would then need to provide guidance on how to evaluate a predicate
offense’s “seriousness” or level of violence, should it endorse either option.

328. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (providing that anyone denied “relief” by the AG “may file a
petition with the United States district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial
review of such denial”).
329. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 297–303 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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Despite the clear constitutional concerns, the Court denied certiorari on the
DOJ’s appeal of Binderup in June 2017.332 For the Court to uphold its
promise from Heller to expound upon the justification for § 922(g)(1) and
clarify this facet of Second Amendment jurisprudence, it needs to accept the
next petition dealing with this matter, which would likely come from an
individual in a circuit that deemed as-applied challenges impermissible or
from an individual in the Third Circuit whose challenge was denied under the
Binderup test. Importantly, it is not enough for the Third Circuit to evaluate
its Binderup test under the aforementioned analysis or any other. Unless the
Court acts, the circuit split will remain and an individual’s fundamental right
to bear arms will continue to be determined by where he or she lives.
CONCLUSION
We teach our children that when we make promises, we must keep them.
In Heller, the Court promised that it would clarify Second Amendment
jurisprudence as the issues arose. Instead, it has consistently failed to keep
its promise and allowed a deeply unsettling circuit split over the
permissibility and application of as-applied challenges to the longstanding
and aggressively enforced felon-in-possession prohibition. The Court cannot
continue to side-step its responsibilities and must deal with the uncertainty
and chaos created by its decision in Heller. Anything less than deciding this
issue would result in the Court shirking its duties by allowing a troublesome
circuit split—whether individuals can look to the courts to have a
fundamental right restored—to continue. Regardless of one’s position on
guns, the determination of a fundamental right based on where you live is
troubling.

332. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.

